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NOTES
THE PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACTS-CHAPTER IV,
PART 6: RESHAPING THE
TRUSTEE'S SWORD
A 1971 Brookings Institution report describes the existing
bankruptcy process as an "assembly of administrative and fiscal
error and confusion [which] has become an accepted way of
professional life."' Congress, having recognized the need to study
the bankruptcy process, created the Commission on Bankruptcy
Laws, which proposed the completely new Bankruptcy Act of
1973.2 Some of the changes suggested by the Commission, how-
ever, have not been well received by the bankruptcy bar. In 1974,
the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges responded to the
Commission's Bill with their own proposed act.3 At first glance, the
two proposals appear to be virtually identical. However, a number
of substantial differences exist.4 One of the most important differ-
ences concerns the nature and extent of the powers given the
trustee to avoid certain transfers made by the bankrupt.5 The
purpose of this Note is to compare the trustee's avoidance powers
under the present Bankruptcy Act with his proposed powers under
the Judges' and the Commission's Bills.
A fundamental goal of the bankruptcy system is the equal
distribution of the bankrupt's assets to his unsecured creditors.6
1 D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH ET AL., BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM 4 (1971).
2 Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468 (1970); COMM'N ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE
UNITED STATES, REPORT, PART II (Proposed Bankruptcy Act), H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) [hereinafter cited as Commission's Bill]. The proposed legislation was
introduced in Congress as H.R. 10792 and S. 2565, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
3 The National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges had their proposed act introduced in
Congress as H.R. 16643 and S. 4046, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) [hereinafter cited as the
Judges' Bill]. The bankruptcy judges were formerly called referees in bankruptcy. The new
bankruptcy rules elevated them to judgeship status. BANKRUPTCY RULE 90 1(7). References
jointly to the Commission's Bill and the Judges' Bill are hereinafter cited as the "proposals."
4 See generally Lee, A Critical Comparison of the Commission Bill and the Judges' Bill for the
Amendment of the Bankruptcy Act, 49 AM. BANK. L.J. 1 (1975).
5 Probably the largest difference between the proposals is the Commission's new
administrative procedures which eliminate Judges. See Walker, An Introduction to the Proposed
Bankruptcy Act of 1973: From Revision to Revolution, 41 TENN. L. REv. 635, 643-46 (1974).
6 E.g., Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color Corp., 313 U.S. 215, 219 (1941); COMM'N ON
THE BANKRUPTCY LAwS OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT PART I, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 213 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Commission's Report]; 3 W. COLLIER,
BANKRUPTCY 60.01 (14th ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as COLLIER]; Seligson, Preferences
Under the Bankruptcy Act, 15 VAND. L. REv. 115 (1961). Since secured creditors and certain
types of general creditors receive more than the percentage given to other creditors upon
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The power of the trustee to set aside a bankrupt's transfers of his
property and recapture assets for the distributable estate is there-
fore essential. Unless the trustee has avoiding powers, a bankrupt
could frustrate this purpose by transferring all of his assets to his
friends, relatives, or favored creditors before bankruptcy.7 The
principal avoiding powers of the trustee under existing law are
contained in section 60 (preferences), 8 section 67d (fraudulent
conveyances), 9 section 70c (trustee as a lien creditor), 10 and section
70e (trustee as a successor to the creditor's state law claims)." The
proposals grant the trustee the power to negate the bankrupt's
transfers in Chapter IV, part 6-Collection and Liquidation of the
Estate-and in Chapter IV, part 3-Administration. The focus of
the present analysis will be upon these provisions.
I
PREFERENTIAL TRANSFERS
At common law a debtor had the power to convey all of his
assets to one of his creditors, thus preventing his other creditors
from collecting their debts.12 Such preference of one creditor to
the detriment of others shortly before bankruptcy obviously would
frustrate the attempt to achieve a fair and equitable distribution
among all creditors. Therefore, the earliest provisions of bank-
ruptcy law were designed to deal with such preferences. 3 Closely
related aims of a preference proscription are to lessen the likeli-
hood that creditors will be scrambling to obtain advantages over
one another and to preclude their making unwise loans upon
promises of a subsequent preferential payment.' 4 The present
distribution of the bankrupt's estate, the significance of this equal distribution goal could be
challenged. See Morris, Bankruptcy Law Reform: Preferences, Secret Liens and Floating Liens, 54
MINN. L. REv. 737, 738 (1970). Perhaps the proper way to phrase this goal is that all
creditors are to be treated fairly, which means that all creditors of a certain type are to
receive equal treatment although differential treatment may exist between the types of
creditors. D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, supra note 1, at 9-10.
SCommission's Report 18.
8 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1970).
9 11 U.S.C. § 107(d) (1970).
10 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1970).
11 1 U.S.C. § 110(e) (1970).
3 COLLIER 60.02
13 Id. 60.04-.06.
14 COMMISSION'S REPORT 202; D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, supra note 1, at 9; Seligson,
supra note 6, at 115-16; Note, Voidable Preferences: An Analysis of the Proposed Revisions of
Section 60b of the Bankruptcy Act, 1974 Wis. L. REv. 481, 483.
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Bankruptcy Act and the two proposed acts deal with the problem
of preferences in distinct ways.
A. The Basic Elements of a Voidable Preference under Section 60
Section 60a defines a preference as (1) a transfer of the
bankrupt's property (2) to or for the benefit of a creditor (3) on
account of an antecedent debt (4) made when the bankrupt was
insolvent (5) within four months of the date of the filing of a.
petition in bankruptcy (6) which enabled the preferred creditor to
obtain a greater percentage of his debt than another creditor of the
same class. 15 Even if all of the elements defining a preference exist,
the trustee still cannot recover the property preferentially trans-
ferred by the bankrupt to one of his creditors unless a further test
is met: to be a voidable preference, the preferred creditor must have
had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent.' 6 In
addition to defining a voidable preference, section 60 contains
complex timing provisions, which, in effect, shift the actual date of
a transaction to a later point in time.17 This shifting critically
affects whether a transaction is deemed to be within the four-
month zone as well as the time at which some of the elements of a
preference are determined.
The proposals have taken a different approach to defining a
voidable preference. They categorize creditors according to their
relation to the bankrupt. Preferences are thus treated as involving
either insider creditors or non-insider creditors.
B. Elements of a Non-Insider Preference under the Proposed Acts
Under the proposals a non-insider voidable preference exists
if (1) a transfer of the bankrupt's property (2) when the bankrupt
was insolvent (3) to pay or to secure his antecedent debt (4) occurs
within three months of the date of bankruptcy. 8 The proposals,
through an exception to the preference measure, add a fifth
element: the transfer must enable the preferred creditor to obtain
a greater percentage of his claim than other creditors of the same
Bankruptcy Act § 60a, 11 U.S.C. § 96(a) (1970). A preference may be voluntary or
involuntary. In a voluntary preference, the bankrupt of his own free will transfers some of
his property to a creditor. In an involuntary preference, the preferred creditor seizes, usually
through judicial process, some property of the bankrupt.
16 11 U.S.C. § 96(b) (1970). See, e.g., Note, supra note 14, at 483-84.
11 See notes 59-63 and accompanying text infra.




class, or must result in an unpaid creditor of a class higher than the
preferred creditor's class. 19
1. A Transfer of the Bankrupt's Property
The proposals retain the section 60 criterion that there must
have been a transfer of the bankrupt's property. Obviously, a
creditor could not be preferred unless he receives from the bank-
rupt part of the bankrupt's property. However, neither the cur-
rent act nor the proposals define what constitutes a bankrupt's
property. Thus, the case law under the Bankruptcy Act ihat does
broadly define what constitutes a bankrupt's property will have
continued validity.20 In light of modem commercial transactions
that have given rise to many new and different property interests,
the use of a flexible common-law approach, rather than a rigid
statutory definition, seems appropriate.
Bankruptcy does not distribute all of the assets of a bankrupt
to his creditors. He is permitted to keep certain "exempt" prop-
erty.2" Rutledge v. Johansen2 2 established that section 60 does not
apply to a bankrupt's transfer of his exempt property. The Rutledge
court reasoned that no creditor was harmed by such transfer since
an exempt asset is not a part of the distributable estate of the
bankrupt. 23 The proposals create a new approach to transfers of
exempt assets: preferences made with exempt assets are recover-
able either for the benefit of the distributable estate if the bankrupt
voluntarily transferred them, or for the benefit of the bankrupt if
19 Commission's Bill § 4-607(b)(3); Judges' Bill § 4-607(b)(2).
20 The existing case law on what constitutes a debtor's property is summarized in 3
COLLIER 60.07(2), which describes it as anything of value which could pay a debt. In
§ 4-601, the proposals define the property of a debtor's estate. This section does not aid the
determination of a debtor's § 4-607 property because it defines property of the estate as
property recovered under § 4-607. Commission's Bill § 4-601(a)(3); Judges' Bill § 4-601(a)(3).
See generally Walker, supra note 5, at 646-49. The Commission's Bill may broaden the
meaning of "transfer" to reach tax liens. See generally Plumb, The Tax Recommendations of the
Commission on the Bankrupky Laws-Priority and Dischargeability of Tax Claims, 59 CORNELL L.
REV. 991, 1006 n.94 (1974).
21 Bankruptcy Act § 6, 11 U.S.C. § 24 (1970). The present act allows a bankrupt to keep
whatever property his state of domicile declares to be exempt from judicial process. Walker,
supra note 5, at 648-49. Because of the great variation among the exemption laws of the 50
states, a bankrupt in one state often cannot keep property which a bankrupt in another state
could retain. See, e.g., Countryman, For a New Exemption Policy in Bankruptcy, 14 RUTGERS L.
REV. 678 (1960); Note, Bankruptcy Exemptions: A Full Circle Back to the Act of 1800?, 53
CORNELL L. REV. 663 (1968). The proposals establish a uniform federal exemption law.
See Liebowitz, Exemptions Under the Proposed Bankruptcy Act, CASE & COMMENT, Mar.-Apr.
1975, at 3; Walker, supra note 5, at 648-49.
22 270 F.2d 881 (10th Cir. 1959).
23 Rutledge v. Johansen, 270 F.2d 881, 882 (10th Cir. 1959); 3 COLLIER 60.25.
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he involuntarily transferred them.24 The rationale for this approach
is unclear. The Commission dismisses the importance of the Rut-
ledge concept that there is no diminution of the distributable estate
without articulating its reasons for changing the existing law.
25 Of
course, if the treatment of exempt assets in the proposals furthers
the goals of a preference provision, it would be justified. Recovery
of a transferred exempt asset, whether for the benefit of the
bankrupt or for the benefit of the distributable estate, fails to
advance the bankruptcy goal of achieving an equal distribution of
the bankrupt's assets to his unsecured creditors because he could
make the identical transfer to the preferred creditor after bank-
ruptcy.2 6 However, such a recovery promotes the two other pref-
24 Section 4-607(a) applies to all of the bankrupt's property, whether exempt under the
proposals or otherwise. Commission's Bill § 4-607, Note 9. After the recovery of a preferen-
tially transferred exempt asset, § 4-503 of the proposals controls the subsequent disposition
of that asset. Section 4-503(h) of the Commission's Bill (Judges' Bill § 4-5030)) provides:
No property recovered under the provisions of this Act shall be allowed as exempt
if the property recovered was concealed or voluntarily transferred by the debtor,
unless so transferred to secure a debt and then only to the extent the value of the
property exceeds the debt.
If the bankrupt voluntarily made the preferential transfer, he cannot keep the exempt asset
or its value and it remains a part of his estate which the trustee distributes to his creditors.
Commission's Bill § 4-503, Note 15; Commission's Report 204. If the bankrupt involuntarily
made the preferential conveyance, he may keep the exempt asset. Commission's Bill § 4-503,
Note 15. Neither proposal defines "voluntary." The Commission gives an example of an
involuntary transfer as one in which the creditor acquired his preference by seizing the
exempt asset through judicial process. Id Even with this example as a benchmark, deciding
whether a specific act by a bankrupt fits the voluntary or involuntary category could be
difficult. For example, would the intentional failure of a bankrupt to defend a quasi-in-rem
proceeding against his exempt asset result in a voluntary transfer? The proposals could aid
the courts in resolving such issues by placing guidelines in their commentary.
25 The Commission completely ignores the Rutledge rationale and instead suggests that
a literal reading of § 60a(1) demonstrates that it applies. Commission's Bill § 4-607, Note 9;
Commission's Report 204. Although ignoring the Rutledge concept of no diminution of the
distributable estate in this context, the Commission uses it to create an inventory and
accounts-receivable exception to its preference provisions. Section 4-607(d) exempts inven-
tory and accounts receivable creditors who meet specified conditions from the preference
proscription provided that they do not improve their position "at the expense of the estate."
Commission's Report 209; see notes 10 1-07 and accompanying text infra. Thus the Commis-
sion builds into this exception a notion of not diminishing the distributable estate.
26 The Commission, using egalitarian lenses, sets aside exempt transfers because the
creditor who received the exempt asset has netted a larger percentage of the debt owed him
than other creditors have realized. Commission's Report 204. However, the Commission sanc-
tions the same unequal result by permitting the bankrupt to make the identical transfer after
bankruptcy. Commission's Bill § 4-507, Note 2. More importantly, the proper focus of the
preference goal of equal distribution is on each creditor receiving his fair share rather than
on one creditor receiving more than the other creditors. See note 6 supra. A creditor receives
property from the bankrupt's distributable estate. Any conveyance of the bankrupt's prop-
erty which would have formed a part of his estate thus reduces the amount of property
distributed to each creditor and impinges on this goal. On the other hand, each creditor
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erence purposes by stopping the creditors' "race of diligence" to
get exempt assets and by inhibiting their making unwise loans to
the bankrupt upon his promise of subsequently transferring to
them exempt assets. Thus, recovery of a preferentially transferred
exempt asset furthers some of the purposes underlying a prefer-
ence provision. However, these policy goals fail to indicate whether
such a recovery should be for the benefit of the bankrupt or for his
distributable estate.27 A fundamental purpose underlying all of
bankruptcy, giving the bankrupt a fresh start after bankruptcy,
28
suggests that the recovery should be for the benefit of the bank-
rupt. A recovery for the bankrupt ensures his possession of those
minimal assets that the draftsmen deem necessary to begin anew.
On the other hand, a recovery for the distributable estate not only
might mean that the bankrupt lacks the necessary assets to begin
anew, but might deprive him of any future consideration which the
preferred creditor had promised to give him in return for the
preference. Therefore, the proposals which wisely alter current law
by authorizing recovery of preferential transfers of exempt assets
should be changed to give the recovered assets to the bankrupt.
2. When the Bankrupt was Insolvent
Whether a bankrupt is solvent or insolvent at the time of a
transaction has little relation to the three goals of a preferenceprovision29 The lack of harm to his other creditors if he remains
solvent after a conveyance justifies this criterion.30 Although both
proposals keep the existing balance-sheet approach to computing
solvency, they change current law by excluding a bankrupt's
exempt property from the equation."' Because a creditor cannot
normally reach a bankrupt's exempt property, this is a good
receives the same amount of property after a bankrupt transfers an exempt asset as before
such transfer because the asset never would have formed a part of his estate. Since each
creditor still receives his fair share after a transfer of an exempt asset, such transfers do not
impinge on this aim.
27 Since the mere ability to seize the exempt asset from the preferred creditor promotes
the goals of the preference provision by destroying his incentive to obtain it, the subsequent
disposition of the exempt asset is relatively unimportant with respect to these goals.
28 Commission's Report 79.
29 Id. at 204.
30 Id.
31 Insolvency occurs under the Bankruptcy Act when a bankrupt's debts exceed the fair
value of all of his property excluding that transferred in contravention of the fraudulent
conveyance provisions. Bankruptcy Bill § 1(19), 11 U.S.C. § 1(19) (1970). See generally 1
COLLIER 1.19. The proposals define insolvency in § 1-102.
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proposal; it gives a more realistic picture of the bankrupt's worth
vis-4-vis his creditors.32
The Commission's Bill also changes the evidentiary treatment
of the insolvency issue. Under current law, which is unaffected by
the Judges' Bill, the trustee has the burden of proof as to the
bankrupt's insolvency.33 The Commission wisely gives the trustee a
rebuttable presumption of insolvency during the three months
preceding bankruptcy. 34 Since the aims of a preference provision
are not furthered by this element, the burden of proof should be
on the creditor rather than on the trustee.
3. Antecedent Debt
The existence of an antecedent debt is an essential element of
a preference because without it the transferee of the bankrupt's
property could not have been a creditor of the bankrupt. The
Bankruptcy Act fails to define "antecedent debt." Both proposals,
however, provide statutory definitions of this term.
The Commission's Bill defines an antecedent debt as one
incurred more than five days before a transfer that pays or secures
the debt.35 The five-day requirement thus creates a "grace period"
of five days for all credit transactions. 6 Since the commercially
important secured transactions enjoy at least a ten-day grace
period under the Commission's Bill,3 7 creation of this uniform
interval seems unnecessary. The Commission's rationale for the
grace period is to prevent the harsh results which can occur upon
application of the Hotchkiss doctrine under which repayment of a
loan on the day it was made can be set aside. 38 Professor Morris
3 2 Adding in the bankrupt's exempt assets could preclude a creditor or the debtor from
initiating a bankruptcy proceeding even though the debt exceeds the total of all of the
property of the debtor reachable by the creditor. E.g., Waddell v. Fleming, 510 F.2d 4, 6-7
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 2629 (1975); Lasswell v. Stein-Block Co., 93 F.2d 322 (5th
Cir. 1937): In re Baumann, 96 F. 946 (W.D. Tenn. 1899); see generally Note, The Balance Sheet
Test of Insolvency, 23 U. PiTT. L. REv. 5 (1961).
33 See, e.g., Bumb v. Paulin Motor Co., 454 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1972). The Judges' Bill
keeps this in § 4-607(a)(2).
34 Commission's Bill § 4-607(f).
35 Id. § 4-607(g)(1).
36 A debt may be repaid within five days of its making without invoking the preference
provision.
3 Under the Commission's Bill, the perfection of a security interest made within ten
days of a transaction relates back to the date of the transaction, thereby creating a ten-day
grace period in which to perfect. Commission's Bill § 4-607(g)(7). See notes 65-67 and
accompanying text infra.
38 Commission's Bill'§ 4-607, Note 6. In National City Bank v. Hotchkiss, 231 U.S. 50
1976]
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believes that a harsh result may occur in many common unsecured
transactions that involve short delays between receipt of and pay-
ment for goods or services. 39 Examples of this type of transaction
are credit card purchases, utility bills, wages, and rent, most of
which would seem to be protected by the Commission's small-debt
exception to the preference provision.40 Even if the small-debt
exception fails to prevent harsh results, the Commission arbitrarily
draws the line at five days. Since the grace period fails to further
any important policy in an equitable manner, the Commission
should abandon it.
The Commission exempts four types of transactions from the
preference provision by excepting them from the definition of an
antecedent debt. The first exception is for debts incurred for
"personal services."'4 1 Confusion will be likely to result from the
failure to define what constitutes a personal-service debt because
many debts could arguably be so characterized. For example,
attorneys' fees, brokers' fees, medical bills, and restaurant bills
might be called personal-service debts although the Commission
apparently intended that this exception apply only to employees.
42
Since employees receive a distribution priority under the Commis-
sion's Bill, 43 allowing a preference exception for them would elimi-
nate needless handling charges that would occur if the property or
its value were recovered and then later returned to them in a
distribution. But even so limited, this exception would allow a
bankrupt to give his property to a selected group of his employees
and ignore the rest of his workers. To prevent this possibility and
to clarify the scope of the personal-service exception, the Commis-
sion should redraft it.
The payment of utility bills is the Commission's second excep-
tion.44 Its rationale for favoring this type of creditor is that the
payment of utility bills does not substantially violate any of the
(1913), the court held preferential a delay of five hours in repaying a loan used to obtain
stock which was in the ordinary course of business immediately pledged in order to repay
the loan.
39 Morris, supra note 5, at 762.
40 The Commission excepts most transfers of less than an aggregate amount of $1,000
from the preference provision. Commission's Bill § 4-607(b)(1). Thus, at least as to many
consumer transactions there should be no preference problems. The Commission fails to
indicate the magnitude of this problem in the commercial area. Of course, as already noted,
secured reditors enjoy a ten-day grace period. See note 37 supra
41 Commission's Bill § 4-607(g)(1)(A).
42 Id. § 4-607, Note 6.
4 1d. § 4-405(a)(3).
44 Id. § 4-607(g)(1)(B).
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purposes supporting a preference proscription and such payments
are not voidable under current law because the utilities usually lack
the requisite section 60b reasonable cause to believe that the
bankrupt was insolvent.45 The Commission's abolition of section
60b scienter as an element of a voidable preference is inconsistent
with its use of the utilities' lack of scienter as a rationale for this
exception.46 The Commission fails to explain its conclusion that no
substantial transgression of the aims of a preference provision
would occur. Why should the payment of a utility bill not substan-
tially impinge on the purposes of a preference proscription when
an equivalent payment to a different creditor substantially in-
fringes these purposes? A social policy rationale, however, supports
this exception: utilities, that supply consumers with necessities of
life, should not be tempted to cut off services to consumers. 47
The third exception proposed by the Commission is for debts
arising from inventory delivered in the ordinary course of business
and paid for within three months.48 The Commission unfortu-
nately uses the same dubious justifications for this favored treat-
ment as it uses for favoring the utilities.49 Considering the advan-
tageous position given by the Commission to inventory sellers who
take steps to protect themselves by obtaining and perfecting se-
curity interests, 50 it seems unjustifiable to safeguard those sellers
who fail to protect themselves. Thus, the Commission should
abandon the inventory exception.
Finally, the Commission excludes certain executory contracts
45 Id. § 4-607, Note 6; Commission's Report 201.
46 The Commission abolishes the creditor's scienter element because it has largely
frustrated the effectiveness of the preference proscription. See notes 68-71 and accompanying
text infra. Making the preference provision more effective by eliminating the scienter
element must be intended to reach transfers which were not previously avoided because of
an inability to prove scienter.
"" During the winter of 1974, public utilities reportedly turned off power in thousands
of homes across the United States for failure to pay rapidly inflating fuel bills. N.Y. Times,
Jan. 6, 1975, at 1, col. 2. One year earlier, the cutting off of heat to an elderly couple's home
for failure to pay a $202 fuel bill resulted in the couple's freezing to death. Id. at 20, col. 6.
48 Commission's Bill § 4-607(g)(1)(C).
49 Id. § 4-607, Note 6 (lack of reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent);
Commission's Report 201 (no substantial impairment of bankruptcy preference policy).
5' The Commission gives an inventory creditor, who enabled a debtor to buy the
inventory, ten days in which to perfect his security interest after the bankrupt acquired
rights in the inventory. Commission's Bill § 4-607(g)(7). His after-acquired property clause is
validated. See notes 105-07 and accompanying text infra. Thus, an inventory creditor who
complies with the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code to obtain and perfect a




from the category of antecedent debts. 51 This qualification shields
customers of a bankrupt who are making payments on an item
before receiving full title to it. Protection of such persons seems to
be a reasonable accommodation of consumer interests.
An antecedent debt under the Judges' Bill is one incurred
more than thirty days before payment or before the perfection of a
security interest.52 This one-month grace period magnifies the
disadvantages of the Commission's five-day period. The Judges'
Bill contains only one exception-for "personal services. 5 3 Unfor-
tunately this provision suffers from the same difficulties as the
Commission's personal-services exception.
4. Obtaining a Greater Percentage than Another Creditor
of the Same Class
The proposals retain the existing law's requirement that the
preferred creditor must have received a greater percentage of his
claim than other creditors of his class.54 This element measures the
equality of distribution to all of the creditors. Since neither pro-
posal defines the term "class," it appears that the presently-
employed Swarts approach, defining it as the group of creditors
who receive priorities in the distribution of the bankrupt's estate,
would be continued. 55
5. The Preference Time Zone
Section 60 affects only those transfers that occur within four
months of the date of the filing of a petition in bankruptcy.
Although limiting preferential conveyances to a time zone does not
of itself serve bankruptcy goals, it is justified by policies similar to
" Commission's Bill § 4-607(g)(1)(D). Existing law may well take care of this problem.
Cf. In re Easy Living, Inc., 407 F.2d 142 (6th Cir. 1969) (lien of a creditor of a purchaser
from the bankrupt upheld against the trustee's § 70a attack even though the bankrupt had
the certificate of title).
52 Judges' Bill § 4-607(h)(1).
53 Id.
54 Commission's Bill § 4-607(b)(3); Judges' Bill § 4-607(b)(2).
56 Swarts v. Fourth Nat'l Bank, 117 F. 1, 6-7 (8th Cir. 1902). See Glessner v. Massey-
Ferguson, Inc., 353 F.2d 986, 992 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 970 (1966)
(conditional vendors do not constitute a separate class from unsecured creditors); 3 COLLIER
60.34; Note, "Class"-The Forgotten Element of Section 60a(1) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 ARIz. L.
REv. 360, 365-66 (1969). By changing who receives distribution priorities, the proposals
change the composition of classes for preference purposes. For example, the Commission
changes existing law on wage priorities, which does not consider employees' annuity plans as
being within the priority (e.g., Joint Indus. Bd. v. United States, 391 U.S. 224 (1968)), by
allowing fringe benefits claims as a priority. Commission's Bill § 4-405(a)(4), Note 4.
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those underlying a statute of limitations.5 6 Because the choice of
the length of the time zone is arbitrary, 57 it is difficult to evaluate.
The Judges' Bill continues the four-month zone whereas the
Commission's Bill specifies a three-month zone. 8
A bankrupt's transfer occurring outside of the preference time
zone may be deemed to have been made within it unless the
transfer was perfected "outside" of the zone.5 9 A conveyance is
deemed made on the date that it meets the perfection tests of
section 60a(2).6 0 A conveyance of property other than real prop-
erty is perfected and thus deemed made when no subsequent
judicial lien creditor of the bankrupt could acquire rights superior
to those of the creditor-transferee. 6 1 A conveyance of real proper-
ty, on the other hand, is perfected and thus deemed made when no
subsequent bona fide purchaser from the bankrupt could acquire
rights superior to those of the creditor-transferee.6 2 Aside from
bringing transfers within the time zone, section 60a(2) shifts the
point in time for determining the presence or absence of the other
elements of a voidable preference from the actual transfer date to
the deemed transfer date.6 3 Both proposals retain the section-
60a(2) concept.6 4
56 See generally 6 S. WILLISrON, LAW OF CoNTRAcrs §§ 2001-44 (rev. ed. 1938).
57 Commission's Bill § 4-607, Note 10.
58 Id. § 4-607(a)(1); Judges' Bill § 4-607(a)(1). The Commission shortened the prefer-
ence time period because it strengthened the trustee's avoiding power by eliminating the
creditor's scienter element and giving the trustee a presumption of insolvency. Commission's
Bill § 4-607, Note 10. Apparently, the Commission balanced the preference goals against a
stability of transactions policy in making this decision.
59 Bankruptcy Act § 60a(7), 11 U.S.C.§ 96(a)(7) (1970). For example, if the bankrupt
transfers a security interest to his creditor one year before bankruptcy, but his creditor
delays perfecting it until two months before bankruptcy, § 60a(7) deems the bankrupt to
have made the transfer two months before bankruptcy, thus subjecting the transfer to the
avoidance power. If the creditor never perfected the security interest, § 60a(7) deems the
date of bankruptcy as the date that the bankrupt transferred the interest to him. To escape
the effect of this deemed transfer provision, a creditor must perfect his security interest at
least four months before bankruptcy.
60 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(2) (1970).
61 Bankruptcy Act § 60a(2), 11 U.S.C.-§ 96(a)(2) (1970).
62 Id. § 60a(7), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(7).
6 The time at which a transaction is deemed to have been made measures the
transfer of the bankrupts property, the antecedent debt, and the insolvency elements.
However, the date of the bankruptcy petition always measures whether or not a creditor
obtained a greater percentage of his claim than other creditors of his class. 3 COLLIER
60.35-.36.
64 Commission's Bill § 4-607(g)(6)-(7); Judges' Bill § 4-607(i)(1)-(2). The proposals also
harmonize the § 60a(2) division of property into real and non-real with the Uniform
Commercial Code, which governs fixtures as well as personal property by subjecting fixtures
to the lien-creditor test of perfection. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-313.
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Section 60 contains complex provisions creating a grace period
during which a creditor may perfect a security interest in the
bankrupt's property after advancing credit to the bankrupt while
avoiding the section 60a(2) effect.65 The proposals simplify this by
providing for a uniform ten-day grace period.6 6 Presumably, the
federal grace period preempts the grace period provided in the
Uniform Commercial Code,67 but this should be explicitly stated.
6. Reasonable Cause to Believe the Debtor Was Insolvent
For the trustee to avoid a preference under section 60, he
must prove that the creditor had reasonable cause to believe that
the debtor was insolvent. Both proposals abolish this require-
ment.68 The Commission's reason for eliminating it is that it "has
rendered ineffective the preference section of the present Act." 69
Although the burden of showing a creditor's scienter certainly
creates difficulties, they have not been insurmountable.7 0  An
analysis of this criterion's impact on the goals of a preference
6 Bankruptcy Act 60a(7), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(7) (1970). Section 60a(7)(I) creates two
grace periods in which to perfect security interests. First, if state law provides a grace period
of 21 days or less, such grace period is adopted for bankruptcy purposes. Second, if the state
law provides no grace period, then a 21-day period in which to perfect security interests is
adopted for bankruptcy purposes. A grace period is an interval of time after the creation of
a security interest in which a creditor can perfect without invoking the deemed transfer
provisions.
The § 60a(7) grace periods of bankruptcy do not mesh well with the Uniform
Commercial Code. The Code creates a ten-day grace period in which to perfect a purchase
money security interest if filing is required. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-301(2). Liter-
ally read, § 60a(7) would adopt the Code's ten-day period and use it as the grace period for
purchase money security interests. II G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROP-
ERTY § 45.8, at 1328 (1965). Since the Code does not create a grace period for other types of
security interests, § 60a(7) appears to give non-purchase money security interests a 21-day
grace period in bankruptcy. II G. GILMORE, supra, at 1327. However, this is anomalous
because the Code often favors purchase money interests over regular security interests.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-107, Comment 1; II G. GILMORE, supra, at 1328. Relying on
the Code policy favoring purchase money interests, some commentators have suggested that
these interests should be given a 21-day grace period. 1 P. COOGAN, W. HOGAN, & D. VAGT$,
SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9.03 (5)(c), at 995 (1963).
Nevertheless, the Code policy favoring purchase ioney interests can also be harmonized
with § 60a(7) by arguing that non-purchase money security interests should have a
zero-day grace period in bankruptcy because the Code impliedly specifies a zero-day period
for them when it creates a ten-day period for purchase money interests. II G. GILMORE,
supra, at 1327-28.
66 Commission's Bill § 4-607(g)(7); Judges' Bill § 4-607(i)(2).
67 See note 65 supra.
68 Commission's Bill § 4-607(a)(1); Judges' Bill § 4-607(a)(1); Commission's Report 201.
69 Commission's Report 204.
70 A large number of cases have found the scienter element. See generally 3 COLLIER
60.54 (collecting cases).
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proscription, however, provides a better reason for its abandon-
ment. When a creditor joins the race of the diligent or makes an
unwise loan with the intention of subsequently obtaining a prefer-
ential transfer, he, of course, knows of the bankrupt's probable
insolvency. Thus, the requisite scienter does not impede the
achievement of the goals of preventing the creditors' race of
diligence and of inhibiting unwise loans. However, requiring proof
of the creditor's knowledge allows those creditors who lack such
knowledge to obtain more than their fair share of the distributable
estate. This requirement thus impedes the most important aim of a
preference provision: the equal distribution of the bankrupt's as-
sets to his unsecured creditors.7 1 It is not surprising, therefore, that




Section 60 makes no distinction based on a creditor's relation
to the bankrupt. Both proposals, however, create a separate cate-
gory of preferences for creditors who are "insiders. 17 3 Insiders are
defined as persons with certain family relationships to the bank-
rupt, affiliates of the bankrupt, or if the bankrupt is a business, its
directors, officers, partners, or managing agents.7 4 Deciding who
fits into most of these categories is relatively easy.7 5 Although the
71 Professor Morris suggests that the Act requires proof of a creditor's scienter because
the preferred creditor has done nothing dishonorable unless he possessed reason to know, the
cost of setting aside these preferences exceeds the benefit gained from recapturing them,
and waste would occur in that the asset taken away from the preferred creditor might later
be returned to him in a distribution. Morris, supra note 6. A bankrupt's transfers frustrate
the equal distribution goal whether or not the creditor acted dishonorably. The small loan
exception meets the argument of the cost of recovery exceeding the benefit to the estate. See
notes 92-93 and accompanying text infra. Although waste occurs if a preferred creditor
happens to receive the recaptured asset in a distribution, the sdenter element exempts
transfers regardless of whether or not the preferred creditor would subsequently receive the
asset in the distribution of the bankrupt's assets. Overall, little reason exists for retaining the
requirement that a creditor have reason to know of the bankrupt's insolvency at the time of
the transfer.
72 Commission's Bill § 4-607(a)(1); Judges' Bill § 4-60'7(a)(1).
73 Commission's Bill § 4-607(a)(2); Judges' Bill § 4-607(a)(2).
74 kLd
7' The terms "partner," "officer," and "managing agent" seem clear enough for a court
to apply in most situations. The proposals give a specific list of family members who com-
prise the insider family group. Commission's Bill § 1-102(32); Judges' Bill § 1-102(33). A
corporate "affiliate" is defined, in most situations, in terms of the control of voting power in
a corporation. Commission's Bill § 1-102(4); Judges' Bill § 1-102(2). Possible ambiguity could
arise as to the last two portions of the definition of an affiliate, which are based upon the
operation under lease of a substantial amount of property. Commission's Bill § 1-102(4)(B),
(E); Judges' Bill § 1-102(2)(D), (E). In addition a court could create ambiguity if it decided
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proposals create a separate insider category of preferences, they
also allow the trustee to challenge a bankrupt's conveyance to an
insider creditor under the non-insider provision.
7 6
Under the Commission's Bill, the trustee can recover a trans-
fer made by the bankrupt to an insider by proving that (1) it
occurred within twelve months before the date of the bankruptcy
petition, (2) it was for an antecedent debt owed to the insider, (3) it
was made when the bankrupt was insolvent, and (4) the insider had
reasonable cause to know of this insolvency.77 Since the trustee can
challenge a bankrupt's transfer to an insider under either the
insider or the non-insider provision, the Commission in effect gives
the trustee a three-month time period within which to challenge all
transfers and an additional nine-month period within which to
challenge insider transfers. 78 The attack against an insider differs
from the attack against a non-insider in that, with respect to the
former, the trustee receives a nine-month longer preference time
zone, must prove an additional element of the creditor's scienter
("reason to know"), and loses the presumption of insolvency. The
reason for the additional time allotment for challenging insider
conveyances appears to be that a creditor's insider position would
enable him either to know of the approach of bankruptcy well
before it actually occurs or to persuade the insolvent bankrupt to
wait three months after his conveyance to the insider before
declaring bankruptcy.7 9
By insisting that the trustee prove scienter, the Commission
limits his avoiding power in the additional nine-month period.
Since the purpose of this additional nine-month time zone is to
correct abuses resulting from a creditor's close relation to the
bankrupt rather than directly to further the three purposes under-
lying a preference proscription,8" the Commission wisely insists
that the § 1-102 definitions, conflict with the use of these terms in § 4-607. Judges' Bill
§ 1-102; Commission's Bill § 1-102 (general definitions apply unless inconsistent with usage).
76 Commission's Report 201.
77 Commission's Bill § 4-607(a)(2).
78 Commission's Report 201.
79 If the purpose for the additional nine-month period is generally to further the three
goals of a preference provision, then the operation of the provision should not be restricted
to insiders. Clearly, the provision aims at some problem which inheres in insider status. Most
likely an insider creditor differs from a non-insider creditor in that the insider either
possesses more knowledge or exercises more influence over the bankrupt than the non-
insider. Cf Note, supra- note 14, at 495.
80 Since the scienter requirement has no "rational connection with the objective of [the
preference] provision," it seems contradictory to resurrect this element for insider transac-
tions. Commission's Report 19-20; Note, supra note 13, at 495. However, the insider
proscription aims not at the general goals underlying the preference provision but rather at
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that the insider have had reasonable cause to believe that the
bankrupt was insolvent. However, placing the burden of proof as
to the creditor's knowledge on the trustee seems unwise; the
insider is in a far better position to demonstrate what information
he had and what information he lacked.
The Commission fails to explain why it shifted the burden of
proving insolvency to the trustee. Possibly it believed that it had
gone too far in undermining the security of insider transactions.8 '
However, the insider's probable access to the relevant financial
information about the bankrupt at the time of the transfer favors
placing the burden on him. The complicated task of weighing
these conflicting policies makes it difficult to decide who should
bear the burden of proof on insolvency. The unrelatedness of the
insolvency of the bankrupt to the three aims of a preference
proscription 82 suggests striking the balance in favor of placing the
burden of proof on the insider.
The Judges' insider-preference proscription is the same as its
non-insider one except that it allows the trustee to recapture
preferential conveyances to insiders made within one year of
bankruptcy and it shifts the burden of proving solvency to the
insider. 3 Unlike the Commission's provision, the Judges' Bill does
not require that an insider have had reasonable cause to believe
that the bankrupt was insolvent. Thus, an insider transfer can be
more readily avoided than a non-insider transfer. This results in a
four-month period for challenging conveyances to non-insider
creditors and a separate one-year period for attacking conveyances
to insider creditors. This attack on insiders appears to be excessive
in light of the normal needs of the trustee. 84 Since the Commis-
sion's more moderate approach reaches the evils of insider trans-
fers, the Judges' discriminatory treatment of all insider transfers is
unwarranted.
D. General Exceptions in the Proposals
The proposals generally except from their preference provi-
sions transfers followed by subsequent advances, transfers related
to enabling loans, and small transfers.
the dangers arising from the nature of the insider relationship with the bankrupt. See note
79 supra. These dangers can occur only if the insider possesses scienter.
8 See Note, supra note 14, at 495.
82 See notes 29-32 and accompanying text supra.
83 Judges' Bill § 4-607(a)(2).
84 Cf Note, supra note 14, at 493.
1976]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:257
1. Subsequent Advance Exception
The proposals derive from sections 60c and 60a(8) the
subsequent-advance exception, which allows a creditor who re-
ceived a preference to set off against the amount that the trustee
could otherwise recover from him any unsecured advances of
credit that he made after the preferential transfer.85 Allowance of
this exemption does not appear to violate any of the aims of a
preference proscription because the subsequently advanced unse-
cured credit restores the bankrupt's distributable estate.8 6
2. Enabling-Loan Exception
The enabling-loan exception contained in the proposals has no
counterpart in existing law. If credit is advanced to the bankrupt to
enable him to obtain property and if the creditor perfects his
security interest in that property within ten days of the bankrupt's
acquiring rights in it, then the preference provision does not
apply.8 7 Allowing this exception, however, clearly violates some of
85 Commission's Bill § 4-607(c)(2); Judges' Bill § 4-607(c)(2).
86 Commission's Bill § 4-607, Note 15. This restorative effect can be seen in a simple
example. Assume that creditor A receives within one year of bankruptcy a $5,000 payment
for an earlier unsecured loan #1. At this point § 4-607 would avoid the transfer and
recapture $5,000 for the distributable estate. Assume that creditor A then loans the
bankrupt $3,000 without taking any security. Under the subsequent advance exception the
difference of $5,000 minus $3,000 or $2,000 would be avoided. Thus, the distributable
estate would have $2,000 recovered as a preference and $3,000 received from creditor A's
unsecured loan #2 for a total of $5,000, precisely the amount of the original preference. In
this way, a subsequent unsecured loan restores the bankrupt's estate and results in the
bankrupt's other creditors suffering no diminution of their fair shares. Since the other
creditors suffer no diminution, there does not appear to be any violation of the equal
distribution goal. See note 26 supra.
Nevertheless, an atomistic view of the above example could indicate that the subsequent
advance exception does infringe upon the goal of an equal distribution. Before the
bankrupt preferred the creditor, the estate had $5,000. The second loan gave the estate an
additional $3,000. Arguably, then, the estate should have $8,000 for distribution instead of
being "restored" to $5,000. Such an atomistic view, however, assumes that the second loan
would have been made even if the bankrupt had not repaid the first loan. This may be an
unrealistic assumption.
This exemption encourages neither unwise loans nor a creditors' scramble because the
creditor never improves his position vis-4-vis the estate by making a subsequent advance. In
the above example, the creditor always has an unsecured claim against the estate for $5,000.
Before he made the second loan, the trustee could set aside the entire preference and
relegate him to a $5,000 claim against the estate. After he made the second loan, this
exception would give him a $2,000 claim arising from the trustee's recovery of the sum plus
a $3,000 claim arising from his second loan against the estate, for a total claim of $5,000.
Aside from not infringing upon these bankruptcy policies, this exemption promotes the
commercial goal of extending new credit to debtors in financial trouble. Commission's
Report 210.
87 Commission's Bill § 4-607(c)(1); Judges' Bill § 4-607(c)(1).
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the policy objectives of a preference proscription. 88 Apparently,
the rationale for it is to put the secured creditor who enables a
bankrupt to buy property on the same footing as a conditional
seller.8 9 Since article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code already
accomplishes this, 90 little reason exists for the exception. The
Commission does point.out that the Code has a tracing-of-funds
clause which the enabling-loan exception lacks, 9' but it fails to
provide any rationale for abandonment-on the federal level--of
the Code's tracing term.
3. Small-Debt Exception
In addition to the above exceptions, the Commission creates a
new one for a preferred creditor who has received an aggregate of
less than $1,000 in value from the bankrupt and who is not an
insider.92 The Judges' Bill, however, contains no similar provision.
Administrative ease and the high costs of recovering such small
amounts justify this minor subordination of preference policy, and
its unavailability to insiders should prevent abuse of this excep-
tion. 93
E. Inventory and Accounts-Receivable Financing
Since 1959 a great controversy has arisen over the validity of
after-acquired property clauses in commercial security agree-
'8 The enabling loan exception violates the preference aim of an equitable distribution
because it allows a creditor to make an unsecured loan and then to obtain a security
agreement and perfect a security interest when the bankrupt receives the asset. Since the
loan was initially unsecured, it became a part of the distributable estate. The subsequent
perfection removed this sum from the estate, thereby decreasing the distributable estate,
which thereby infringes upon the distribution goal.
This exception also infringes upon the preference goal of preventing a creditors'
scramble because it encourages the unsecured creditors to perfect on recently acquired
assets and to claim that their loans were made to enable the bankrupt to purchase the
recently acquired assets.
9 In commenting on the enabling loan exception, the Commission refers to Uniform
Commerdal Code § 9-107(b) which gives a creditor who enabled a debtor to obtain an asset
the same rights that a seller of the asset to the debtor would possess. Commission's Report
208; UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-107, Comment 1.
90 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-107(b).
91 Commission's Report 208.
92 Commission's Bill § 4-607(b)(1).
93 Commission's Report 206. The Brookings Institution study found that in 11 to 15%
of liquidation proceedings the costs of administration exceeded the assets of the estate. D.
STANLEY & M. GIRTH, supra note 1, at 175. In the proceedings in which the creditors
received a distribution dividend, about 25% of the entire assets were used for administrative
claims. Id. at 176; Note, 32 ALBANY L. Rxv. 407 (1968). Given the high cost of administering
the bankruptcy liquidation combined with the litigation expenses of attacking a small
transfer, the net benefit to the distributable estate in challenging such a transfer is minimal.
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ments. 94 These provisions give a creditor an additional security
interest in property that a debtor acquires after the execution of a
security agreement. Inventory and accounts-receivable financing
arrangements typically contain such clauses and the Uniform
Commercial Code expressly validates them.95 However, even
though the bankrupt executes the security agreement more than
four months before bankruptcy, the trustee, by taking an "atomis-
tic" view of the Code, is able to argue that the after-acquired
security interest, created on inventory or accounts receivable ob-
tained by the bankrupt within the preference zone, arises in the
zone and is therefore a preference. 96 Secured creditors have de-
veloped a number of responses to the trustee's argument. They
urge that the entity,97 the "fat-pig,"98 the substitution-of-collateral, 99
94 There is a vast array of literature taking various views of the issues involved in
after-acquired property clauses. E.g., Finan, The Secured Party and his Nemesis, the Trustee in
Bankruptcy: After-Acquired Property, Unidentified Proceeds, and Selected Preference Problems, 3
AKRON L. REV. 93 (1970); Healy, The Floating Lien Controversy in the Courts: Judicial Response to
the Preference Problem, 10 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 265 (1969).
95 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-204; Healy, supra note 94.
9 Gordon, The Security Interest in Inventory Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code
and the Preference Problem, 62 CoLUM. L. REV. 49 (1962); Hogan, Games Lawyers Play with the
Bankruptcy Preference Challenge to Accounts and Inventory Financing, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 553,
556-58 (1968); Kripke, The Code and the Bankruptcy Act: Three Views on Preferences and
After-Acquired Property, 85 BANKING L.J. 377, 394 (1968). The Uniform Commercial Code's
provisions which govern the attachment and perfection of a security interest provide the
basis for the trustee's argument. "A security interest is perfected when it has attached and all
of the applicable steps required for perfection have been taken." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 9-303(1). If all of the applicable steps necessary for perfection are taken before the
security interest attaches, perfection occurs "when it attaches." Id. A creditor performs
all of the applicable steps by properly filing a financing statement related to his security
agreement. Id. § 9-302. Thus, a creditor with an after-acquired property clause in his
security agreement who files a financing statement will have a perfected security interest in his
debtor's after-acquired property when his security interest attaches. A security interest at-
taches when the debtor has signed a security agreement, the creditor has given value to the
debtor, and the debtor has rights in the collateral. Id. § 9-203(1).
The first two requirements for attachment can be met when the creditor files his
financing statement. The third requirement causes difficulty. If the debtor does not acquire
rights in the collateral until he receives the collateral, then perfection occurs when the
debtor receives the asset. For example, if the debtor receives an asset in the preference zone,
perfection of an after-acquired security interest occurs in that zone. The trustee uses the
above reasoning to argue that as to each account receivable or item of inventory received by
a debtor in the preference period, perfection of a security interest on it occurs in the
preference zone, thus subjecting the interest to the preference provisions. In re Portland
Newspaper Publishing Co., 4 CCH INSTALLMENT CREDIT GUIDE T 98,483 (1966) (referee's
opinion), rev'd, 271 F. Supp. 395 (D. Ore. 1967), aff'd sub nom. DuBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d
1277 (9th Cir. 1969).
97 The entity theory focuses on accounts receivable or inventory as an entity. A creditor
perfects on this entity rather than on each component of the entity. The creditor then
argues that he perfected on this entity when he obtained a security agreement and filed a
financing statement on it. His perfection and therefore transfer occurred outside of the
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the equitable-lien, 100 the abracadabra,' 0 ' and the antecedent-
debt' 0 2 theories prevent a section 60 preference. Each of these
theories has flaws when closely scrutinized in light of either the
Code or the Bankruptcy Act and acceptance of some of these
concepts allows massive evasion of the purposes underlying a
preference proscription.0 3
preference zonebefore the debtor acquired the specific account receivable or inventory
item. Moving the date of transfer to the date of filing probably places the transfer outside of
the four-month preference period and also negates the antecedent debt prerequisite for a
voidable preference. Grain Merchants, Inc. v. Union Bank & Say. Co., 408 F.2d 209, 215-17
(7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. France v. Union Bank & Say. Co., 396 U.S. 827 (1969)
(alternate holding); Rosenberg v. Rudnick, 262 F. Supp. 635, 639 (D. Mass. 1967); Healy,
supra note 94, at 273; Henson, § 9-108 of the Uniform Commercial Code and § 60a of the Bankruptcy
Act Reconciled, 21 Bus. LAW. 371, 375 (1966). The entity theory is-also called the river theory or
the res theory. DuBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d 1277, 1287 n.8 (9th Cir. 1969).
9 The fat-pig theory is an analogy to a mortgaged pig being fattened with un-
mortgaged grain. No one would find that a preference occurred with each gulp of the
feeding pig. Hogan, supra note 96, at 558-59.
'9 If a creditor exchanges existing security for new security, no preference occurs
because there is no antecedent debt involved in the transfer. II G. GILMORE, supra note 65,
§ 45.6, at 1315; Hogan, supra note 96, at 561-62. Under the substitution theory creditors
argue that the Code abandoned the need for a strict matching of old security with new
security. Abandonment of a strict matching requirement allows the perfected security
interests arising during the preference time zone to be set off against the perfected security
interests destroyed by the sale of prior inventory (or the collection of accounts receivable).
Grain Merchants, Inc. v. Union Bank & Say. Co., 408 F.2d 209, 217-18 (7th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 827 (1969) (alternate holding); Healy, supra note 94, at 274.
"' The equitable lien theory relies upon § 60a(6) of the Bankruptcy Act which
invalidates certain types of equitable liens. The creditor argues that the after-acquired clause
creates an equitable lien and that such lien meets the requirements of § 60a(6) because he
took all necessary steps to perfect this equitable lien. Finan, supra note 94, at 129-35;
Gordon, supra note 96, at 66-68.
101 The abracadabra theory hinges on § 60a(2) of the Bankruptcy Act which deems a
transfer to be made when it is "so far perfected" that a subsequent lien creditor could not
obtain superior rights. Section 9-301(1)(d) of the Code appears to give an inventory creditor
or an accounts-receivable creditor rights superior to those of a judicial lien creditor from the
date that the financing statement relating to the security agreement was filed. See note 96
supra. Thus, the creditor argues that the transfer is deemed to have occurred at the time of
filing. If the filing occurred outside of the preference period there cannot be a voidable
preference. In addition, moving the transfer date to the date of the original filing may
negate the antecedent debt element. See, e.g., Biggins v. Southwest Bank, 490 F.2d 1304,
1309 (9th Cir. 1973); In re King Porter, 446 F.2d 722, 730-31 (5th Cir. 1971); DuBay v.
Williams, 417 F.2d 1277, 1287-88 (9th Cir. 1969); Rosenberg v. Rudnick, 262 F. Supp. 635,
638 (D. Mass. 1967); Healy, supra note 94, at 273.
102 The antecedent debt theory relies upon § 9-108 of the Code, which rather
directly negates the antecedent debt element by providing that after-acquired security
interests.arising in the ordinary course of the debtor's business are not for an antecedent
debt. In re White, 283 F. Supp. 208, 210 (S.D. Ohio 1967); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 9-108, Comment 1; Friedman, The Bankruptcy Preference Challenge to After-Acquired Property
Clauses under the Code, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 194, 220 (1959); Reimer, Bankruptcy-Preference-
Conflict between Section 9-108 of the Uniform Commercial Code and Section 60(a) of the Bankruptcy
Act, 70 CoM. J. 63 (1965).
103 The difficulty with the entity theory is that §§ 9-204, 9-303, and 9-203 of the Code
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The justification for this exception is the great commercial
importance of these types of financing agreements. 10 4 The propo-
sals attempt to end the confusion concerning after-acquired prop-
erty clauses by excepting those that conform to certain standards.
Both proposals permit such clauses to the extent that (1) the
creditor had a security agreement that covered the subsequent
collateral and (2) the transferee did not improve his position by an
increase in the security's value at the expense of the estate. 10 5 It is
important to note that the first requirement does not require that
the creditor have completed all of the steps necessary under state
law to have a perfected security interest when the bankrupt obtains
the inventory or collateral.'0 6 Read literally, it permits a creditor to
get a security agreement on a bankrupt's existing inventory and
wait until shortly before bankruptcy to file it. Undoubtedly, the
second prerequisite for this exemption, improvement of position at
the expense of the estate, would be interpreted by a court to
preclude this literal absurdity although such an interpretation does
do not take an entity approach to accounts receivable or inventory but rather apply to each
component of them. Countryman, Code Security Interests in Bankruptcy, 75 CoM. L.J. 269, 277
(1970). The fat-pig theory has the same difficulty as the entity theory. The substitution
theory runs against the precise matching requirement of general bankruptcy law. Gordon,
supra note 96, at 63. The equitable-lien theory contradicts the commentary to the Code
which states that the after-acquired clause does not create an equitable lien. UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-204, Comment 1; Seligson, The Code and the Bankruptcy Act: Three
Views on Prferences and After-Acquired Property, 85 BANKING L.J. 377, 404 (1968). See Finan,
supra note 94, at 130. The abracadabra theory is vulnerable to a grammatical construction of
§ 60a(2). The pronoun "it" in § 60a(2) means that an actual transfer must have occurred
before the provisions of § 60a(2) come into operation. The actual transfer does not occur
until the debtor acquires rights in the collateral, which may occur in the preference time
zone. Countryman, supra, at 277. The antecedent debt theory is vulnerable to attack on
federal supremacy grounds in that § 9-108 of the Commercial Code interferes with the
Bankruptcy Act. Gordon, supra note 96, at 58-61; Reimer, supra note 102, at 66; Seligson,
supra, at 405. The entity theory, the fat-pig theory, and the abracadabra theory would allow
a bankrupt intentionally to prefer the inventory or accounts-receivable creditor by convert-
ing his assets into inventory or accounts receivable. Finan, supra note 94, at 127; Hogan,
supra note 96, at 559, 561.
104 Hogan, supra note 96, at 569 n.65; Kripke, supra note 96, at 389-90.
105 Commission's Bill § 4-607(d); Judges' Bill § 4-607(d). The proposals overrule the
abracadabra theory in defining the time of transfer in § 4-607(g)(6)-(7). Commission's Bill
§ 4-607, Note 29.
1'6 Perfection occurs when the last of the following four events are completed: (1) the
taking of applicable steps (usually filing), (2) the debtor's signing of a security agreement, (3)
the creditor's giving value to the debtor, and (4) the debtor's acquiring rights in the
collateral. See note 96 supra. The fourth event has caused the problems in inventory and
accounts receivable financing. See note 96 supra. The proposals condition their exemption on
the prior existence of the security agreement. They do not require that the second or third
events be completed before the debtor acquires rights in the collateral. Thus, perfection may
occur after the proposed acts have exempted the transaction.
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not readily flow from the proposed statute.'07 This section is
sloppily drafted and should be rewritten to avoid this literal absur-
dity.1
0 8
To determine whether a creditor has improved his position at
the expense of the estate, the proposals adopt a "two-point-
measuring-system" test. This examination compares a creditor's
collateral at two points in time: three months before bankruptcy
and the date of filing of the bankruptcy petition. Basically, im-
provement occurs if the percentage of a creditor's debt secured at
bankruptcy exceeds the percentage secured at the anterior point.
Since this test is not stated to be the exclusive yardstick for measur-
ing improvement,, a court could develop its own criterion.
Although the proposed statutory test for improvement is easy
to administer, 10 9 it has several drawbacks as a result of the arbitrary
choice of an anterior measuring point. First, it would allow a
bankrupt to prefer a creditor whose security has lapsed during the
preference zone but who had a large perfected security interest at
107 Two possible arguments based on the second prerequisite for this exception could
prevent the literal absurdity. First, the word "security" in § 4-607(d) could be interpreted to
mean a perfected security interest. The belated filing that perfected the creditor's security
interest which arose from his security agreement executed three months before bankruptcy
would violate the two point measuring test of improvement because the creditor lacked a
perfected security interest three months before bankruptcy. This approach seems proper
and would probably be used. Unfortunately, the proposals do not clearly mandate such an
interpretation. "Security" as used in § 4-607(d) could also be interpreted to include a mere
security interest. The proposals define a security interest as an "interest in property created
by contract to secure performance of an obligation." Commission's Bill § 1-102(43). Surely a
security interest could be considered to be "security" since it secures performance. See
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-105(1)(C) ("collateral" is property subject to a security
interest).
Second, a court could create a nonstatutory test of improvement of position at the
expense of the estate. The basis of the new test would be the notion that since such a belated
filing was a preference under § 60, it must be a forbidden improvement of position at the
expense of the estate. However, such an approach would enable the trustee to resurrect his
atomistic arguments concerning inventory and accounts receivable creditors under the guise
of improvement of position. No ready solution exists to this problem under the language of
§ 4-607(d).
11) Either the first limitation on the exemption should be recast to require that the
creditor have taken all steps necessary under state law to have perfected a security interest or
the word "security" should be replaced with a term requiring a perfected security interest.
109 Mathematically the test can be represented by:
Let X = debt owed the creditor.
Let Y = value of all of this creditor's security for this debt at three months before
bankruptcy or, if new value was extended during the three month period, then
the value of all of his security at the date of extension of new value.
Let Z = value of all of this creditor's security for this debt at bankruptcy.
IfX > Y and if (X - Y) > (X - Z) then there is forbidden improvement at the expense of the
estate.
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the anterior point. Second, it discriminates against the creditors of
a business that has a cyclical flow of inventory or accounts receiva-
ble. For example, if the bankrupt sells his product in three-month
intervals and if the anterior point falls on the day before his sale,
his accounts-receivable creditor cannot keep the additional security
which arose on the next day. Professor Hogan has demonstrated
that replacement of the two-point system with an ordinary-course
of-business yardstick for measuring improvement of position
eliminates these inequities. 110 Under Professor Hogan's test, if the
creditor's security arose in the ordinary course of the bankrupt's
business it would not constitute improvement."' Although such an
approach creates additional factual issues in a bankruptcy proceed-
ing, the Commission provides no compelling reason why the
equities favoring such an approach should be sacrificed to adminis-
trative efficiency."
2
The Commission and the Judges have reexamined the aims
that a preference proscription attempts to achieve and have pro-
posed changes to better meet these aims. To deal with the special
problems of a bankrupt's transfers to insider creditors they have
created a special insider proscription. They have considered and
balanced competing commercial policies with preference policies
through a series of exceptions to the operation of their preference
provisions. Although some of their measures need redrafting to
prevent confusion or undesirable results and others probably
should be abandoned, they have wisely reformed many areas of
the trustee's power to avoid preferential transfers.
II
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES
The proposals retain in a simplified version the section 67d
powers of the trustee to recover property transferred by the
bankrupt to another party in order to defraud his creditors.'
3
This power enables the trustee to recover the bankrupt's property
from any transferee, whether or not such person is a creditor.
110 Hogan, supra note 96, at 569-71.
11 Hogan, supra note 96, at 570.
112 Indeed, the Commission uses an ordinary-course-of-business approach in the inven-
tory exception to the antecedent-debt definition. Commission's Bill § 4-607(g)(1)(c).
113 11 U.S.C. § 107(d) (1970). Commission's Bill § 4-608 and Judges' Bill § 4-609
contain the gist of § 67d. Commission's Report 20. Their simplification of the wording of the
fraud provisions will introduce a variance between the federal anti-fraud law and the state's
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act.
[Vol. 61:257
PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACTS
Thus, it prevents the bankrupt from "hiding" his assets from his
creditors by conveying them to others. 1 4 The impact of this
avoiding power, of course, helps achieve the preference aim of an
equitable distribution of a bankrupt's assets to his unsecured cred-
itors. 1 5 Section 67d reaches conveyances by a bankrupt involving
intentional fraud,"l6  constructive fraud,"17  and partnership
fraud."" The proposals retain the section 67d treatment of inten-
tional fraud" 9 although they modify the treatment of constructive
and partnership fraud. The Commission's Bill also abolishes the
rule of Dean v. Davis.
12 0
A. Conveyances Involving Constructive Fraud
Under the present Bankruptcy Act, a conveyance is construc-
tively fraudulent if the bankrupt received less than fair consider-
ation for his transfer and (1) he was insolvent or thereby became
insolvent, (2) he was engaged or about to engage in business for
which the property remaining in his hands was unreasonably small
capital, or (3) he intended to incur or believed that he would incur
debts beyond his ability to pay.' 21 The proposals keep these
criteria, but they replace "fair consideration" with "reasonably
equivalent value."'122 This change amounts to an elimination of the
good-faith element which was contained in "fair consideration".
23
The requirement that a transferee act in good faith serves no policy
of bankruptcy and is properly eliminated by the proposals. 24
114 1 G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES §1 (rev. ed. 1940).-
115 The recovery of an asset, for the benefit of the distributable estate, conveyed by the
bankrupt to defraud his creditors, increases the fair share which each of his unsecured
creditors receives and thus furthers equitable distribution. See note 26 supra; ef. Commis-
sion's Report 18. In general, a fraudulent conveyance may differ from a preference by
harming only a specific creditor's right of realization rather than harming all of a bankrupt's
creditors. G. GLENN, supra note 114. It has also been suggested that fraudulent conveyance
differs from a preference in that the debtor can personally benefit from the transfer. 3
COLLIER 1 60.03. However, it seems possible that a debtor could receive a personal benefit
such as post-bankruptcy credit in return for preferring a creditor.
116 Bankruptcy Act § 67d(2)(d), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2)(d) (1970).
117 Id. § 67d(2)(a)-(c), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2)(a)-(c) (1970).
118 Id. § 67d(4), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(4) (1970).
119 Commission's Bill § 4-608(a)(1); Judges' Bill § 4-609(a)(1).
120 See notes 133-38 and accompanying text infra.
121 Bankruptcy Act § 67d(2)(a)-(c), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2)(a)-(c) (1970).
122 Commission's Bill § 4-608(a)(2); Judges' Bill § 4-609(a)(2).
123 Section 67d(1)(e) defines fair consideration in terms of a creditor's good faith.
Bankruptcy Act § 67d(1)(e), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(1)(e) (1970); Inland Security Co. v. Kirshner,
382 F. Supp. 338, 347 (W.D. Mo. 1974); De Aragon v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 322 F. Supp.
1006, 1009-10 (D.P.R. 1971), aff'd, 457 F.2d 263 (1st Cir. 1972); 4 COLLIER 67.33.
124 Elimination of the good faith element ensures the vitality of the preference exemp-
tions. In Bullard v. Aluminum Co. of America, 468 F.2d 11 (7th Cir. 1972), a trustee
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The proposals also modify the existing constructive-fraud pro-
visions by eliminating the distinction drawn in section 67d between
existing creditors and future creditors. Under section 67d any
insolvency fraudulent conveyance is fraudulent only as to then
existing creditors of the bankrupt while the other types of con-
structive fraud are deemed fraudulent as to future creditors as
well. 2 5 This distinction serves no apparent purpose and is prop-
erly omitted by the proposals. 26
B. Partnership Fraud
Both proposals keep the section 67d measure declaring that the
transfer of property owned by an insolvent partnership to a part-
ner in his personal capacity is a fraudulent conveyance.' 27 The
need to invalidate these transfers arises from the so-called 'Jingle"
rule under which the trustee applies partnership property to
partnership debts and property of the individual partners to their
individual debts.128 Thus, a transfer of an asset owned, by the
partnership to a partner harms the partnership creditors because
the personal creditors of that partner have priority claims to the
asset under the jingle rule. By eliminating that portion of the jingle
rule which marshals a partner's property to his individual cred-
itors, the proposals appear to diminish the significance of this
avoiding power. 129 However, the need for this power yet exists
because the proposals retain that portion of the jingle rule that
successfully avoided a bankrupt's transfer to one of his creditors in satisfaction of an
antecedent debt by arguing that the creditor lacked good faith due to his knowledge of the
bankrupt's precarious financial position. The trustee could not use the preference power
because the transfer had occurred more than four months before bankruptcy. An enterpris-
ing trustee might use Bullard to attack transactions that are exempted from the preference
provision. Eliminating the good-faith element safeguards those transactions exempted from
the operation of the preference proscription from attack under the flexible doctrine
of fraudulent conveyances. See generally W. WARREN & W. HOGAN, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW 420-21 (1974).
12 Bankruptcy Act § 67d(2), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2) (1970).
126 Professor Glenn suggests that this distinction is necessary because the debtor's act
must be related to his subsequent debt. 1 G. GLENN, supra note 114, § 319. This reason does
not explain why the act protects the future creditors of a business with inadequate capital
but not the future creditors of a person who'is insolvent and thus has inadequate personal
capital. In addition, it ignores the fact that the fraud provision aids the bankruptcy goal of
equality of distribution. See note 115 supra.
127 Commission's Bill § 4-608(b); Judges' Bill § 4-609(c).
128 Bankruptcy Act § 5g, 11 U.S.C. § 23(g) (1970). See generally Kennedy,A NewDealfor
Partnership Bankruptcy, 60 COLUM. L. REv. 610 (1960); Mac Lachlan, Partnership Bankruptcy,
65 COM. L.J. 253 (1960).
129 Kennedy supra note 128, at 621-24; Mac Lachlan, supra note 128, at 258. Section
4-405(f) and § 5-202 of the Commission's Bill and § 4-405(f) and § 5-201 of the Judges'
Bill eliminate this portion of the jingle rule.
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marshals partnership property to partnership creditors. 130 Thus, if
a bankrupt transfers a partnership asset to a partner, although the
partnership creditors still have claims on the asset equal to those of
the partner's personal creditors, the partnership creditors no
longer have a superior claim to it.'3' The proposals also abandon
the section 67d clause that makes a partnership transfer to a
non-partner fraudulent, because this type of conveyance is covered
by the constructive-fraud and intentional-fraud provisions.
32
C. The Dean v. Davis Rule
Dean v. Davis'33 held fraudulent a mortgage given by the
bankrupt to his brother-in-law in return for cash which was sub-
sequently used to prefer a creditor of the bankrupt. Section 67d(3)
was enacted in an attempt to codify this case.' 3 4 The Judges' Bill
keeps a simplified version of section 67d(3) 135 while the Commis-
sion's Bill abandons this rule. 36 The Commission's approach ap-
pears to be the better one. The Dean problem can best be handled
by having the trustee avoid the preference under the preference
provisions.137 By recapturing the preferentially conveyed property,
a virtual rescission of the initial transactions occ'urs as the preferred
creditor is returned to his original position while the secured
creditor receives the equivalent of his advance. Commercial con-
siderations make this result superior to that occurring under sec-
tion 67d(3). Section 67d(3) hinders the ability of a troubled busi-
130 Commission's Bill § 4-405, Note 14.
131 For example, if the assets of the A & B partnership are sufficient to satisfy its
creditors, these creditors will receive all of theA & B partnership assets and be fully satisfied.
Commission's Bill § 4-405, Note 14. If the A & B partnership transfers -one of its assets to
Mr. A, which makes the A & B assets insufficient to satisfy the A & B creditors, then the A &
B creditors could seek recovery against Mr. A's personal assets. Commission;s Bill § 5-202;
Judges' Bill § 5-201. If Mr. A is personally insolvent, the A & B partnership creditors can
force Mr. A into bankruptcy and share pro rata with Mr. A's individual creditors in the
distribution of Mr. A's estate. Commission's Bill § 5-202, Note 2; Proposals § 4-405(f).
However, because the A & B partnership creditors only get a pro rata share of their claim,
they receive less than they would have received if the partnership asset had never been
transferred to Mr. A.
132 Commission's Bill § 4-608, Note 7.
133 242 U.S. 438 (1917).
134 W. WARREN & W. HOGAN, supra note 124, at 389 n.1.
13- Judges' Bill § 4-609(b).
136 Commission's Bill § 4-608, Note 3.
137 In Aulick v. Largent, 295 F.2d 41 (4th Cir. 1961), the court voided a preference
given to the creditor which was associated with a fraudulent conveyance. Aulick involved the
transfer of securities by the debtor to a third party in return for the third party's endorsing a
note of the bankrupt's which was given to a creditor. Id. at 42-43. The court referred to Dean
in avoiding the endorsed note given to the creditor. Id. at 48. This case is criticized in 7
VILL. L. REv. 468 (1962).
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ness to obtain needed financing, because a creditor cannot as-
suredly protect himself against the possibility of the business failing
since any security taken by him might be invalidated in a later
bankruptcy proceeding upon a showing that the business had used
his money to pay off one of its prior creditors. 138 Under the
Commission's "rescission" approach, the secured creditor keeps his
security in the bankruptcy proceeding; thus, there is no deterrence
to the extension of credit to a troubled business.
D. Time of a Fraudulent Conveyance
Section 67d reaches only those fraudulent transfers made
within one year of bankruptcy. 3 9 Both proposals retain this limita-
tion period except for fraudulent partnership conveyances, for
which no limiting period is provided. 40 The Commission fails to
give any explanation for not limiting the trustee's power in this one
area. The policy favoring security of transactions, which underlies
the concept of a limitations period, suggests that this change in
existing law is unwise.
Existing law, which deems a transfer to be made when it is
perfected, continues under the proposals.' 4 ' Both proposals, how-
ever, change the current meaning of "perfection" from perfection
against a bona fide purchaser to perfection effective against a bona
fide purchaser other than a buyer in the ordinary course of
business. 42 Under the Uniform Commercial Code a buyer in the
ordinary course of business cuts off the security interest of his
seller's creditor. 43 If the term "bona fide purchaser" is interpreted
to include the rights of the Code's buyer in the ordinary course, a
secured creditor of a seller would never appear to meet the
existing perfection test.' 44 The proposals thus introduce a much
138 A business suffering from financial difficulties might naturally be required to give
security for a new loan. However, if the new creditor knows that his loan will be used to pay
some but not all of the then existing debts, the new creditor's security is vulnerable to
§ 67d(3). Thus, § 67d(3) had hindered the obtaining of credit by troubled businesses.
Commission's Bill § 4-608, Note 3; Commission's Report 212.
139 Bankruptcy Act § 67d(2),(4), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2),(4) (1970). The one-year limita-
tion acts as a statute of limitations. 4 COLLIER 67.34, at 516.
140 Commission's Bill § 4-608(a); Judges' Bill § 4-609(a),
141 Commission's Bill § 4-608(d)(1); Judges' Bill § 4-609(e)(1).
142 Id.
143 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-307(1). A buyer in the ordinary course cuts off a
perfected security interest of a creditor as well as an unperfected security interest of the
seller's creditor. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-307, Comment 1.
144 If the bona-fide-purchaser test of § 67d(5) includes a buyer in the ordinary course,
even a perfected security interest could not pass thE § 67d(5) test and thus a secured creditor
would always be deemed to have made a transfer at the date of bankruptcy.
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needed element of harmony between bankruptcy law and the
Code.
III
THE AVOIDING POWER OF THE TRUSTEE UNDER STATE LAW
A. The Strong-Arm Clause and the Hypothetical
Lien Creditor
The problem of creditors appearing in bankruptcy with liens
whose existence was unknown to the bankrupt's other creditors led
to the enactment of section 70c.145 It gives the trustee the power to
avoid transactions that could be set aside under state law by certain
types of creditors of the bankrupt. The Bankruptcy Act considers
the trustee to possess on the date of bankruptcy the rights existing
under state law of (1) a creditor who obtained a judgment against
the bankrupt, (2) a creditor who obtained an execution returned
unsatisfied against the bankrupt, and (3) a creditor who obtained a
lien on the bankrupt's property by legal or equitable proceed-
ings.14 n Although the proposals give the trustee the rights of the
second and third types of creditors, they strip him of the first
because he gains no additional rights by having the status of a
judgment creditor.147 The magnitude of the trustee's power as a
lien creditor under state law has led to this portion of section 70c
being described as the "strong-arm clause.' 148 Under current state
law, the Uniform Commercial Code, the clause gives the trustee
the power to invalidate unperfected security interests.
49
Section 70c adds at the end of the strong-arm clause the
phrase "whether or not such a creditor exists." This phrase adds a
hypothetical quality to the trustee's status. Problems arise over the
impact, if any, of the existence of actual creditors on the hypotheti-
cal nature of this status.' 50 Prior to the 1972 amendments of the
145 E.g., Southern Dairies, Inc. v. Banks,, 92 F.2d 282, 285 (4th Cir. 1937), cert. denied,
302 U.S. 761 (1937); 4A COLLIER 70.45.
146 Bankruptcy Act § 70c, 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1970).
147 Commission's Bill § 4-604, Note 1; Countryman, The Use of State Law in Bankruptcy
Cases (Part I), 47 N.Y.U.L. REv. 631, 649 (1972).
148 4A COLLIER 70.45.
149 4A COLUER 70.49, at 596; Countryman, supra note 147, at 651-56.
1I0 For example, in Constance v. Harvey, 215 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 913 (1955), the court interpreted the hypothetical nature of the trustee's power to mean
that the trustee was deemed to have extended credit during a delay in perfection. Under
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Code, it implied that if all of the actual creditors of a bankrupt had
knowledge of an unperfected security interest, then the trustee as
well had knowledge of that security interest. 15' The attribution of
such knowledge to the trustee precludes him from avoiding that
unperfected interest. 152 Both proposals prevent the knowledge of
actual creditors from affecting the trustee's status.153 Since the
strong-arm clause is not based on a theory of subrogating the
trustee to the rights of actual creditors, the knowledge of actual
creditors should not affect the trustee's status. A second difficulty
surfaced when the Ninth Circuit decided Pacific Finance Corp. v.
Edwards, 15 4 which held that although the hypothetical nature of the
trustee's status obviates the need for the existence of an actual lien
creditor, the trustee cannot invalidate a security interest unless he
proves that an actual creditor exists who, if armed with a lien, could
defeat the challenged security interest. Interpreting the section 70c
power of the trustee as requiring the existence of an actual creditor
seems to make redundant the power given to the trustee in section
70e as a virtual subrogee of the rights under state law of the
bankrupt's actual creditors. 155 Unfortunately, the Commission's
Bill fails to clarify this problem. The Judges' Bill, however, wisely
overrules Pacific Finance, thereby harmonizing the trustee's power
under the section 70c strong-arm clause with his power under
section 7 0e as a subrogee to the rights of existing creditors.' 5
state law this interpretation permitted the trustee to avoid the tardily perfected security
interest. After Constance a trustee appeared to be able to avoid tardily perfected security
interests even though no actual creditor extended credit in the interval before perfection. W.
WARREN & W. HOGAN, supra note 124, at 357. The Supreme Court in Lewis v.
Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 364 U.S. 603 (1961), overruled Constance and held that all of the
trustee's hypothetical rights as a lien creditor arise on the date of bankruptcy.
'5' UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-301(3) (1968 version); Countryman, supra note 147,
at 653-54.
152 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-301(l)(b) (1968 version); Countryman, supra note
147, at 653.
153 The last sentence of § 4-604(a) of the proposals provides that the trustee's rights and
powers are "not . . . affected by his own knowledge or that of any or all creditors."
154 304 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1962).
155 To have meaning, § 70c must create powers which are apart from those conferred
under § 70e. Thus, Pacific Finance should not have required the existence of an actual
creditor because § 70e confers powers on the trustee based on the existence of actual
creditors. King, Pacific Finance Corporation v. Edwards: Another Misreading of Section 70c of the
Bankruptcy Act, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 232, 238 (1963). Cf 4A COLLIER 70.50.
156 The second sentence of the Judges' Bill § 4-604(a) provides that the trustee's powers
are "not dependent upon the existence of a creditor whose hypothetical possession of such




B. The Trustee's Avoiding Power as Subrogee
of Actual Creditors
1. Permissible Creditor Roles
Section 70e grants the trustee the power to avoid transfers by
the bankrupt that could be set aside under state law by actual
creditors who have claims provable under section 63 against the
bankrupt.157 In order to be provable, a claim must fit into one of
nine categories.1 58 Both proposals modify section 70e by replacing
the requirement that a claim be provable with one that it be
allowable.' 59 The proposals define an allowable claim as one which
does not fit within one of eight categories. 6 ° Since section 63 takes
an inclusionary approach in defining provability while the propos-
als follow an exclusionary approach in defining allowability, claims
that were not provable under section 63 might be allowable under
the proposals.' 6' Thus, the proposals appear to strengthen the
trustee's avoiding power as a virtual subrogee of the actual credi-
tors of a bankrupt.
162
Some commentators have suggested that section 70e grants the
trustee the rights of any actual secured creditor of the bankrupt. 63
Possession of these rights would make the strong-arm clause
largely superfluous because the Uniform Commercial Code gives a
secured creditor priority over a lien creditor. 64 The proposals
wisely reject this approach and restrict the trustee's rights to those
of unsecured creditors.'
6 5
2. Magnitude and Scope of the Trustee's Avoiding Power
Section 70e appears to subrogate the trustee to the rights
exercisable under state law by the bankrupt's actual creditors. A
157 Bankruptcy Act § 70e, 11 U.S.C. § 110e (1970).
258 Id § 63, 11 U.S.C. § 103 (1970).
159 Commission's Bill § 4-604(b); Judges' Bill § 4-604(b),
160 Commission's Bill § 4-403(b); Judges' Bill § 4-403(b).
16 For example, the proposals allow intentional tort claims which were not provable
under Section 63. Commission's Bill § 4-403, Note 2.
162 The proposals' creation of new claimants upon the distributable estate mandates
expanding the trustee's power in order that bankruptcy treat the newly-recognized claims in
the same manner as claims recognized under the current act.
163 See, e.g., Countryman, The Use of State Law in Bankruptcy Cases (Part II), 47 N.Y.U.L,
Rv. 631, 657-61 (1972); Kennedy, The Trustee in Bankruptcy as a Secured Creditor under the
Uniform Commerdal Code, 65 MICH. L Rxv. 1419, 1420-28 (1967),
164 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-301 (1)(b), (4). See Kennedy, supra note 163 at
1434, 1440.
"' The proposals contain a clause requiring that the claims be allowed in a "Chapter V
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bankrupt's transfer to a third party may be vulnerable to an attack
under state law by one but not all of the bankrupt's creditors.
Subrogation theory suggests that in such a case the trustee's recov-
ery under section 70e would be limited to the extent of this
creditor's claim and would be for the benefit of this creditor.
However, under the doctrine of Moore v. Bay, 166 which is codified
in the Judges' Bill, 167 a transaction partially vulnerable to the attack
of an existing creditor may be completely avoided by the trustee
for the benefit of all of the general creditors. The rationales
advanced to justify the Moore v. Bay rule are that it helps the
creditor who could have attacked the transfer, it punishes the
fraudulent bankrupt, and it fulfills the congressional intent. 168
With respect to the first rationale, it is clear that, unlike the
subrogation approach, which would completely satisfy this credi-
tor's claim, the Moore v. Bay rule recovers for the distributable
estate from which this creditor gets only a percentage of his claim
measured by the claims of all of the other creditors of the bank-
rupt. The justification provided by the second rationale is just as
weak. Fraudulent conduct by a bankrupt should be dealt with by
the fraudulent-conveyance provisions. Finally, prior congressional
intent, by itself, provides no justification for retaining the rule.
Although the Uniform Commercial Code has greatly limited the
impact of Moore v. Bay,' 69 the Commission has wisely abandoned
the doctrine and adopted the subrogation approach. 70
IV
NEWLY CREATED AVOIDING POWERS FOR THE TRUSTEES
The proposals give the trustee some new avoiding powers. In a
reorganization proceeding under Chapter VII of the Commission's
case." Commission's Bill § 4-604(b)(1); Judges' Bill § 4-604(b)(1). This precludes the trustee
from asserting the rights of a secured creditor since § 5-101(b) only permits creditors to
participate to the extent that they lack secured status. Commission's Bill § 4-607, Note 5.
166 284 U.S. 4 (1931).
167 Judges' Bill § 4-604(b)(1) ("for the benefit of the estate").
168 G. GLENN, supra note 114, §§ 326, 505; Schwartz, Moore v. Bay: Should Its Rule Be
Abolished, 29 REF. J. 67 (1955); Note, The Trustee in Bankruptcy and the Secured Creditor, 17
ARK. L. REV. 47, 56 (1962); Note, Suits by Representatives to Set Aside Fraudulent Conveyances, 45
YALE L.J. 504, 506-07 (1936).
169 Under the Commercial Code a creditor must levy in the gap between the creation of
a security interest and the perfection of that interest in order to have priority over that
security interest. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-301(1)(b). In Moore v. Bay the applicable
state law apparently gave priority to a nonlevying gap creditor over the security interest.
Thus, the Code's change in state law greatly restricts the impact of Moore v. Bay on
commercial transactions. Countryman, supra note 163, at 656-57; Hawkland, The Impact of the
Commercial Code on the Doctrine of Moore v. Bay, 67 COM. L.J. 359, 361 (1962).
170 Commission's Bill § 4-604(b)(1) ("to extent of such allowable claim or claims for the
benefit of such creditor or creditors").
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Bill, the trustee appears to have been given a de facto avoiding
power. The possible existence of this power can be illustrated by
the following example. Assume that an inventory creditor has a
perfected security interest in item A of the bankrupt's inventory
and has an after-acquired property clause in his security agree-
ment. If the bankrupt is in a Chapter VII Reorganization, the
trustee has the right to "use" the inventory. 17 1 If the trustee sells
item A, the secured creditor loses his security interest in that
item. 72 If the trustee then buys a new asset for the bankrupt's
inventory, item B, the secured creditor would expect to have an
equivalent security interest in item B due to his after-acquired
clause. However, section 7-203(a)(2) of the Commission's Bill ren-
ders his after-acquired property clause inoperative. If the bankrupt
then converts to a liquidation proceeding, the secured party ap-
pears to have lost his secured position. This interpretation of
section 7-203 would give the trustee the power to invalidate per-
fected security interests; but little reason exists for allowing the
trustee to have such a power since it would inhibit the incentive for
becoming a secured creditor. Although section 7-203 can also be
interpreted as not giving the trustee this new power, 73 the Com-
mission should redraft it to preclude the above interpretation. The
Judges' Bill contains no section similar to the Commission's section
7-203.
Both proposals add a new avoiding power to the trustee's
already impressive arsenal against insiders. Any of the bankrupt's
property transferred within one year of bankruptcy to an insider
for his rendering of personal services to the bankrupt may be
recovered by the trustee to the extent that the value of the
property conveyed exceeds the reasonable value of the services
rendered. 4 Even if an insider survives the preference and fraud
171 Commission's Bill § 7-203(a)(1). The trustee may use the property until the secured
creditor terminates the stay of § 4-501.
172 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-307(1).
173 Arguably the conversion would require the trustee to recognize the after-acquired
property interests. Section 4-312(1) provides that a converted Chapter V proceeding is
treated for most purposes as if it began on the date of the filing of the Chapter VII petition.
In a sale of an asset under Chapter V, a secured creditor's interest must be protected.
Commission's Bill § 5-203(b). If the § 4-312(1) principle applies to the earlier sale of the
secured asset, then the conversion into the Chapter V proceeding restores the secured
creditor's position. One commentator has suggested that § 7-203 merely codifies existing law
as expressed in In re Bermec Corp., 445 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. .1971), and does not create any
new avoiding power. Murphy, Restraint and Reimbursement: The Secured Creditor in
Reorganization and Arrangement Proceedings, 30 Bus. L. 15, 48 (1974).
174 Commission's Bill § 4-311(c); Judges' Bill § 4-314(c). The Judges' Bill might be
giving the trustee a new power in its preference section by voiding perfected security
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attacks, he could still be vulnerable under this provision. Sadly, the
proposals fail to state guidelines for a court to use in determining
the reasonable value of an insider's services.
CONCLUSION
The proposals have made an impressive effort to restructure
and strengthen, in the light of modem commercial practices, the
trustee's avoiding powers by creating the non-insider provision to
meet the goals of a preference proscription. To deal with the
special problems of insider creditors, the proposals create a second
type of preference-attacking provision. At the same time, the draft-
ers realized that several competing non-preference policies are
important in this area and created a series of exceptions. Unfortu-
nately, the wording of these exemptions is too loose, thereby
allowing some undesirable results. The proposals modernize and
simplify the trustee's power to avoid fraudulent conveyances while
clarifying his powers under state law and adding an important new
power. Overall, both proposals have done a laudable job in remak-
ing the trustee's sword to function more effectively in modern
commercial transactions. But further attention should be given to
the problems identified in this Note to ensure the success of
bankruptcy-law reform.
Lewis U. Davis, Jr.
interests on collateral purchased by the bankrupt on credit during the preference time
period but not fully paid for by the time of bankruptcy. Judges' Bill § 4-607(e). It is unclear
whether this provision, which is listed as an "exception" to the preference section, only
applies to interests attacked under the preference provision or applies generally to all
perfected security interests. It is also unclear what effect § 4-606(e) has on the specific
preference exemptions such as the inventory exception.
